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Throughout history cities have contained separate areas where ethnic groups are concentrated. In 
the U.S. many older cities in the Northeast and Midwest contain large African-American ghettos. 
We discuss the causes and consequences of ethnic and racial segregation. We identify differences 
between voluntary and involuntary ghettos and we understand them using agglomeration 
economies, positive and negative externalities, bid rent theory, land and labor markets. We show 
that sharply segregated urban land use patterns can be socially efficient or inefficient depending 
on the nature of preferences and the externalities. Exclusionary policies often capture the 
economic efficiency. We observe a bewildering variety of political and public policy responses to 




    In  The Republic, Socrates describes income segregation in the ancient Greek polis and 
prescribes policy: 
         “For, indeed any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor  
            the  other of the rich; these are at war with one another; and in either there are many 
            smaller  divisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark if you treated them as 
            a single  State. But if you deal with them as many, and give the wealth or power or  
            persons of the one to the other, you will always have a great many friends and not many  
            enemies.”  (Jowett, pages 137-138) 
In ancient Rome a spatial integration of the rich (the patricians) and the poor (the 
plebeians) was apparently enforced by urban design:  
           “First of all is the close juxtaposition of the houses of the wealthy and the single- room   
             high-rise apartment dwellings of the poor. As this and many other plan fragments show,  
             there was no significant economic  segregation in Rome… …In our present example of  
             imperial Rome, it is interesting to consider the reality of close physical mixing of social  
             classes against the literary image of the distinct separation of those classes in many social    
              practices.”  (Reynolds (1997), page 16). 
           Although segregation by income need not imply ethnic segregation, the two are strongly 
correlated and evidence of this abounds from later periods. For example, in Constantinople, the 
capital of the Eastern Roman Empire for eleven centuries and the world’s largest city for a long 
time, the majority of the population was Hellenic but certain areas were settled by European 
traders and Jews. After the conquest by the Ottoman Turks in 1453, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, 
and Levantines dominated parts of the city and were wealthier and higher taxed than the ruling 
Turks. 
     The causes of ethnic segregation in contemporary cities are variable. Many large central cities 
on all continents have vibrant Chinatowns. Under South African apartheid blacks and whites were 
required by law to live in separate areas. Black ghettos in the large cities of the American 
Midwest and Northeast emerged as freed slaves moved north to seek a new life within a white 
majority that was racially prejudiced. Although there were no laws restricting location by race, 
privately initiated racial and religious restrictive covenants operated well into the 1950s (Plotkin, 
1999). In today’s Europe, Algerian ghettos in France or Turkish ghettos in Germany have 
emerged much like black ghettos have in the United States as immigrants were injected into a 
society with a different culture, language or religion.  In third world countries, ghettos are often 
informal squatter settlements in the outskirts of large cities because poor migrants from the rural 
areas cannot find affordable formal urban housing. Such are the favelas of Brazil, the gecekondu 
settlements around Turkey’s large cities,
1 or the ghettos of large Asian cities. The impoverished 
settlers in these areas are often of distinct regional or ethnic origin. Asia’s largest slum, Dharavi, 
sits on 427 acres (0.67 square miles) sandwiched between two major north-south railways, near 
the center of Bombay. Estimates of Dharavi’s population range from one half to one million 
people (Sharma, 2000) “crammed into rows of makeshift shanties, cobbled together with nothing 
more than asbestos sheets, plastics, bamboo sticks, discarded canvas bags, wooden planks and 
old car tires” (Katyal and Lengade, 2004). Dharavi’s implied gross population density is 1171 
people per acre or higher, or at most 37 square feet of land per person. The chief occupations are 
leatherworking, embroidering and pickle-making. The land is swampy, lacking toilets and water 
supply. Although many ethnicities mix in Dharavi, 37% of the population, the largest group, is 
Tamil-speaking (Mohite, 2003).        
     I will use ghetto to mean not a slum but any significant and contiguous ethnic concentration 
including an economically vibrant one. The politically correct definition has evolved. A 1979 
                                                 
1 Gecekondu translates as “night-perched” referring to an informal dwelling inconspicuously constructed on 
public land by the squatter in one night. In most cases, this is sufficient to afford the squatter a legality of 
tenure unless the government decides otherwise. 
  2dictionary gives two.
2 The first echoes Europe’s anti-Semitic past: a ghetto is “a section of a city 
in which in former times, in most European countries, all Jews were required to live.” The 
Warsaw ghetto of World War II is the last example of this. The second definition reflects U.S. 
reality. Accordingly, a ghetto is “a section of a city, especially a thickly populated slum area, 
inhabited predominantly by Negroes, Puerto Ricans, or any other minority group, often as a 
result of social or economic restrictions.” By contrast a dictionary published in 1995 reiterates 
the first definition but adjusts the second as “any section of a city in which many members of a 
minority group live.” 
3 
      Does ethnic segregation emerge from voluntary decisions or from social restrictions? Often 
both aspects are present and may be difficult to distinguish. Chinatowns may be largely 
voluntary, while the African-American ghettos of the United States and the Muslim ghettos of 
India are thought to have been caused, in part, by exclusion. We will see that ghettos that emerge 
due to external coercion and those that self-organize have observable differences.  
      Segregation  can  be  measured  at  many  levels of resolution. No matter what the level, it 
exhibits enormous variation among urban areas. Table 1 lists 43 U.S. Primary Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (PMSAs), with over one million population in 1980. I compare the spatial 
segregation of non-Hispanic African Americans by dividing their percentage of the central city 
population by their percentage of the suburban population.
4 I refer to this ratio as the 
ghettoization index. This index, for the year-2000, varies from a high of 21.5 for the Milwaukee-
Waukesha MSA to a low of 0.8 for Miami. The year-2000 index for the United States is 2.6. 
Virtually all of the 23 PMSAs that score higher are in the Northeast or the Midwest and almost all 
that score lower are in the South or the West. The index has come down in each of the 43 PMSAs 
since 1980, as the percent-black of the suburbs has increased faster than the percent-black of the 
central city. In Milwaukee, the most ghettoized PMSA, the index came down from 42 in 1980 to 
21.5 as the suburbs changed from 0.5% to 1.5% black. For virtually all PMSAs that are more 
ghettoized than the nation, the percentage of central city population that is black has increased, 
while for PMSAs less ghettoized than the nation, central cities are stable or becoming less black.                         
[ TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ] 
                                                 
2 The unabridged edition of  The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Random House, New 
York 1973. According to the dictionary, ghetto derives from the medieval borghetto, meaning a “settlement 
outside the city walls” more like today’s suburbs than an American ghetto in an inner city.   
3 Paperback pocket edition of Webster’s New World Dictionary, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1995. 
 
4 Nationwide, about 55% of blacks and  22% of whites reside in central cities, while 55% of  whites and 
31% of blacks live in the suburbs.  
  3       According to the Bureau of the Census, among the same 43 PMSAs in 2000 with at least one 
million people and at least three percent African American population, the most segregated was 
Milwaukee-Waukesha, Wisconsin (Figure 1) and the least segregated was Orange County, 
California (Figure 2).
5 In each figure, a dark gray dot is a concentration of 200 African Americans 
while a light gray dot a concentration of 200 white Americans. In Milwaukee, the dark gray dots 
are thickly clustered and cover a large section of the inner city signifying a ghetto. In Orange 
County the dark gray dots appear randomly dispersed among the light gray dots: there is no 
ghetto. Concentrations of African Americans are much smaller and isolated.     
      What accounts for the sharp contrast between Milwaukee-Waukesha and Orange County?  
Perhaps the most cliché  and  passé explanation is that Midwesterners are far more racially 
prejudiced than Californians. Accordingly, Milwaukee blacks reside in a more hostile 
environment than do Californian blacks and would find it too costly to relocate out of the ghetto. 
But Los Angeles and San Fransisco, two other California PMSAs, contain swaths of African 
Americans and Hispanic neighborhoods. Why then is Orange County different? Midwestern 
blacks not whites may be prejudiced. Then the Milwaukee ghetto is one of self-segregation: not 
exclusionary prejudice by whites, but inclusionary prejudice by blacks. A third explanation, the 
one I favor, is that the racial segregation is driven by income differences inducing self-selection 
in residential locations. Choices depend on a durable land use and housing pattern that is inherited 
from the past. Residential densities in Orange County are lower and housing values higher than in 
Los Angeles and much higher than in the Milwaukee ghetto. Higher income African Americans 
can afford to live in Orange County.
6 If, for blacks, living in a ghetto is an inferior good and 
living in the suburbs a normal good, then those who move to Orange County have no interest in 
forming a ghetto. Whites are also probably less prejudiced against blacks of similar incomes. 
Higher income blacks who move to the suburbs are rarely clustered in ghettos and are accepted in 
predominantly white neighborhoods.
7 The dispersion of Orange County blacks reflects this. 
[ FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE ] 
                                                 
5 For additional maps and extensive documentation of various spatial measures of ethnic segregation, the 
reader is referred to Iceland and Weinberg  (2002). The full report can be seen on the Internet at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-3.pdf 
6 Income differences between white and black Americans have diminished and about 30% of African-
Americans now live in the suburbs (Mills and Lubuele, 1997). 
 
7 There are, however, suburban ghettos where middle or lower income blacks reside. A part of the growing 
suburbanization of blacks seen in Table 1 is, in fact, due to growing black ghettos in some older suburbs of 
large cities. In Atlanta, for example, 25.6% of the suburbs are black who are concentrated in the inner 
southern suburbs. 
 
  4       I  will  show  how  urban  economic  theory  can explain ghettos and ethnic segregation. In 
section 2 I use agglomeration and externalities to explain the formation of voluntary ghettos, 
Chinatowns being examples. In section 3, we see how involuntary ghettos form due to prejudice, 
discrimination or exclusionary policies targeting an ethnic minority. In section 4, I turn to bid rent 
theory and ghettos. What is the pattern of land rent within a ghetto and across the ghetto boundary 
and how is it different for voluntary and involuntary ghettos? In section 5 the central question is 
whether ghettos are efficient. The answer need not be that involuntary ghettos are inefficient.  
The organization of ethnic populations in voluntary or involuntary ghettos can generate net social 
benefits. In section 6 we briefly see how policy and politics in the world has responded to racial 
and ethnic segregation. 
2. The voluntary ghetto  
    Spatial agglomeration explains how virtuous ghettos can form by voluntary atomistic 
decisions. But although the concept of agglomeration has been used to explain the spatial 
concentration of firms, it has not been used to explain ethnic or racial concentrations of people. 
An agglomeration economy exists when the proximity of economic agents reduces costs. Suppose 
that members of an ethnic group have a strong taste for sharing a church or temple, preserving 
customs, trading with each other, borrowing from or lending to each other, speaking their 
language, teaching it to their children or enjoying each other’s company in day-to-day affairs. 
Then, many costs are reduced when a sufficiently large number of individuals, families and 
businesses locate in a contiguous area, forming a ghetto.  
     In a Chinatown, businessmen find it more profitable to set up Chinese food markets, 
families feel secure that their children will speak Chinese and business dealings can be 
conducted in the native tongue avoiding the less familiar customs of the majority.   
Tourists come to enjoy authentic Chinese food or to view Chinese New Year parades. 
Such exportable cultural activities are made possible by the scale of the ghetto.  The 
ethnic ghetto is an entry point for immigrants, easing their cost of transition. After living 
or working in the ghetto, the immigrant becomes adjusted. At a later stage in the life-
cycle he moves out to set up a suburban business or, with some luck and perseverance, 
becomes a CEO. Ghettos also generate negative intra-ethnic externalities. Growing up in 
a purely ethnic environment may slow down assimilation putting the residents at a 
disadvantage. Positive peer effects may be absent in segregated schooling. Spatial isolation can 
have adverse economic effects such as difficulty in acquiring jobs. Ethnic organized crime 
  5networks may flourish in large ghettos but become inoperable when the ethnic population is 
dispersed.  
    The rise and fall of vibrant ethnic ghettos was an ongoing backdrop in American cities in the 
late 19
th and early 20
th centuries. Jewish parts of town, Little Italys and Little Dublins were quite 
common. Eventually, as American-born and English-speaking generations replaced the old, these 
ethnic gems all but vanished as populations became assimilated and affluent, dispersing to the 
suburbs.  Unless there is a continuing influx of new immigrants, the ghetto is depopulated or 
filtered-down to another less-affluent ethnic group. The once vibrant Greektown near downtown 
Chicago has lost most of its Greek population. Suburban Greeks still maintain some businesses 
there. Some cater to ethnic Greeks and others to tourists. But with increasing assimilation and 
fewer immigrants, it becomes harder to save costs by clustering together. Meanwhile, Greek 
churches with dispersed congregations were built in Chicago’s suburbs. Astoria in Queens 
continues to have a considerable but reduced residential and commercial presence by ethnic 
Greeks. Other ethnic groups of Hispanic and Asian origin are now equally dominant. Today’s 
Astoria has the character of a multiethnic ghetto: an agglomeration of diverse groups and 
immigrants who find it cheaper to deal and live with each other than to disperse into the broader 
society.   
3. The involuntary ghetto 
    A major driver of involuntary ghettoization is that individuals join a ghetto to find safety. After 
the anti-Muslim riots of Gujarat in 2002
8, India’s 13% Muslim minority of about 150 million, 
swarmed to existing Muslim ghettos at an accelerated rate. This is induced by growing animosity 
toward Muslims by the Hindu majority as well as by the Muslim’s need for safety. Kawaja (2002) 
claims that ethnic violence against Muslims is highest where they are least concentrated. 
According to some reports, Muslims in Ahmedabad, Delhi and other cities have flooded to 
ghettos, complete segregation being prevented only by skyrocketing ghetto rents (Times News 
Network, 2002).   
     While ghettos may offer safety, they may also facilitate wholesale destruction by accident or 
design. In 1929 a huge fire destroyed the centuries old and exclusively Greek Tatavla district of 
Istanbul, known for its ethnic vibrancy. The Greeks of Tatavla were known for the efficiency of 
their volunteer firefighting force. Was the fire set by the Turkish authorities as is widely claimed 
in the folklore of survivors, and did the Turkish police prevent the Greek firefighters from 
                                                 
8 Amartya Sen, the 2001 Nobel Laureate in economics, points to evidence of  State involvement in the riots 
that started after the Gohdra carnage in which Hindu worshippers were burned inside a railroad car. (The 
Hindu, 2004).  
  6operating, while the public firefighters arrived too late? (Yilmaz,1998).
9 In contrast, twenty six 
years later during the pogrom of 6-7 September 1955, the Turkish authorities had to organize 
numerous mobs that rampaged and sowed destruction through scores of large and small Greek 
residential neighborhoods and business districts dispersed within Istanbul (Ioannides, 1991). The 
direct cost of this, including the blow to Turkey’s reputation, was enormously higher than that of 
the deliberate or accidental fire of 1929. The pogrom of 1955 targeted only Greeks but could not 
distinguish between Greeks, Armenians or Jews where they were spatially mixed. Hence, these 
other groups suffered “collateral damage” (Sachar, 1995).  
    Why are large concentrations of African Americans persisting in many American cities? And 
why are African-American ghettos less vibrant than the ethnic ghettos of the past? One view is 
that the African-American ghetto is not voluntary but results from prejudice, racism, 
discrimination and exclusion on the part of the white majority. Prejudice refers to a negative 
externality a member of a group feels when it is residentially mixed with members of another. 
Other things equal, a prejudiced white prefers an all white neighborhood rather than one where 
some are black. Similarly, a prejudiced black prefers the ghetto. We already argued that a Chinese 
immigrant would rather locate in Chinatown than outside, because the ghetto offers economic 
advantages. The prejudiced immigrant prefers the ghetto even if the same or better economic 
advantages existed outside.  
     Many authors use residential prejudice as implying racism. Racists believe that other races are 
inferior. A prejudiced person may dislike interacting with members of another ethnic group, 
without implying racism. If a Christian does not like to hear Muslim prayers voiced from 
minarets or a Muslim does not like to hear church bells, these prejudices do not mean that they 
hate each other or view each other as inferior only that they may prefer to live separately. Some 
white Americans may prefer neighborhoods that have no blacks because they perceive that if 
blacks moved in, property values would fall. During previous decades, as poorer blacks moved 
into predominantly white areas, white flight ensued and values fell. A few who flee initially can 
spark a wave of white flight. This could occur even if no one white were a racist but many falsely 
believed that there were some among them who are and will flee. With such beliefs a cumulative 
process ensues as a vicious self-fulfilling prophecy. 
      Discrimination means treating other groups differentially. American real estate brokers have, 
for decades, discriminated against blacks by not showing them houses in white neighborhoods or 
urging whites to sell when blacks moved in. There has been evidence that some mortgage bankers 
                                                 
9 The surviving Greek population became dispersed and the Turkish authorities renamed the district 
“Kurtulush” (liberation) allegedly to signify “liberation” from Greeks. 
  7are less likely to approve home loans to African Americans. The term redlining refers to refusing 
loans to people in certain neighborhoods because they are perceived as risky borrowers. 
Discrimination in labor markets (Becker, 1957) can also indirectly affect residential location. 
Prejudice or racism, is not necessary for discrimination to occur. Yinger (1995) has suggested that 
discrimination by brokers was economically motivated. Such agents feared that should they not 
discriminate, they might be penalized by lower pay or job loss.  
      Exclusion is an institutionalized policy that prevents minorities from locating in specific 
places. South African apartheid and the Warsaw ghetto are legalized exclusion. Ethnic 
segregation in Cyprus was imposed in 1974 by the invading Turkish army. Prior to the invasion, 
the 80% Greek majority and 18% Turkish minority were mixed in all cities and most villages. 
The invading army ethnically cleansed nearly 200,000 Greek Cypriots (a third of the total 
Cypriots) from their homes in northern Cyprus, and later distributed their properties to Turkish 
Cypriots who moved north voluntarily and to many illegal settlers from Turkey. Israeli 
settlements inserted into the West Bank and Gaza are another example of exclusionary policies. 
Since the 1967 war, the occupied territories have become more integrated by the insertion of 
Israeli Jews while becoming extremely segregated at the micro level as each such settlement is 
purely Jewish.    
       Exclusionary  policies  abound  in  both  North  America  and  Europe.  Western  European 
governments build housing projects in the suburbs that often house minorities or immigrants. 
These are, in effect, small ghettos. U.S. suburbs often institute large-lot zoning: houses must sit 
on private lots of at least a certain size. This results in only expensive homes being built, which 
remain unaffordable for many minorities. One view is that these ordinances are the result of 
residents’ preferences for low densities. Another view is that poorer residents share the schools 
offered by the suburban community but pay less by residing in a smaller house, since schools are 
funded by ad-valorem property taxes. This free-riding by lower income residents is prevented by 
disallowing smaller houses. The policy seeks to exclude by income, not race or ethnicity which is 
illegal. But, African or Hispanic Americans are on average poorer and are indirectly excluded. 
Suburban schools are segregated and schooling benefits of integration remain unrealized.  
          Back in 1968 John Kain provided a forceful argument that African-American ghettos are 
involuntary. He observed that whites controlling hiring excluded blacks from suburban jobs. 
Because suburban residential zoning also excludes blacks, many don’t apply for suburban jobs or 
cannot commute to them. Kain argued that the resulting exclusion cloisters blacks in inner city 
ghettos and is responsible for the high rates of black unemployment. This is exacerbated by many 
  8blue collar jobs having moved out of central cities to suburban and exurban areas.
10 A vicious 
cycle ensues. As the ghetto economy becomes isolated, unemployment, poverty, crime and social 
problems increase, while political power and public expenditures decline. This feeds the 
perception that the ethnic group is dysfunctional, increasing prejudice. 
          A questionable aspect of Kain’s 1968 argument was that the exclusion of minorities from 
the white areas caused a land limitation, preventing ghetto expansion while population grew. If 
this were true, rents and densities in the ghetto would rise and blacks, on average, would pay a 
higher quality-adjusted unit price for housing than would whites. This observation jars with 
prejudiced whites fleeing expanding ghettos. That would cause a demand reduction, expanding 
the housing stock that filters down to blacks. Blacks in ghettos would then pay a lower not higher 
price for housing. Which version is true? It may be conjectured that in the initial stages of white 
flight, blacks benefit from lowered inner city housing prices. Later, if the ghettos population 
increases but blacks are excluded from surrounding neighborhoods and suburbs, the land 
limitation may become binding.
11 Using my model of city and suburban land and labor markets 
(Anas, 2002), I can show that white prejudice lowers ghetto rents paid by blacks and benefits 
blacks in the housing market, while exclusion raises rents and hurts blacks.    
4. Ghettos and rents 
     Martin Bailey (1959) thought about how equilibrium rents must vary across the ghetto border. 
Figures 3a and 3b depict his analysis. Assume a narrow linear city of unit width. All locations are 
a priori identical. Land must be divided between blacks and whites. Bailey assumed that whites 
are prejudiced and would regard proximity to the border of a black ghetto as a bad, while blacks 
would like to reside with whites, regarding proximity to the border as a good. Suppose that 
distance to the border becomes unimportant beyond one mile. Assuming that blacks and whites 
are identical in income and in other-than-racial preferences, land rent around the ghetto border of 
a segregated city would be as in Figure 3a.
12 If each piece of land is owned by a different 
landlord, the pattern of Figure 3a is unstable. Blockbusting ensues where arbitrageurs buy houses 
from whites just to the right of 0, renting or selling them to blacks. Equivalently, white owners 
sell to blacks and flee. The border moves to the right expanding the ghetto. For arbitrage to be 
                                                 
10 This condition is known as spatial mismatch. For a review of the literature that has accumulated, see 
Kain (1992). 
 
11  Kain and Quigley ( 1972), King and Mieszkowski (1973) and Galster (1977) have found some statistical 
evidence that blacks pay more for comparable housing, although not necessarily a lot more.   
 
12 The slopes of the rent lines within a mile of the border need not be the same since they reflect how much 
blacks value marginal distance to the border and how much whites value marginal distance from the border.  
 
  9unprofitable, black and white bids on a unit amount of land must be equal at the border or, if 
housing conversion is required, then black and white bids on land will differ by the cost of 
conversion per acre. Equilibrium is as in Figure 3b where conversion costs are ignored. Whites 
pay a premium for being prejudiced, thus keeping the ghetto from expanding. This motivates 
whites to institute exclusion. If whites exclude blacks from locating on the white side of the 
border either by discrimination or by zoning, then Figure 3a is sustained because arbitrageurs 
cannot operate. Rents in the white area fall. Without arbitrage, rent at the border is discontinuous. 
       Figures 3c and 3d depict how prejudice and exclusion affect the equilibrium rents on land in 
voluntary ghettos and involuntary slums. The length of the city is fixed at 2a. This allows us to 
see how land rents might be altered by the demands induced by prejudice or exclusion. Figure 3c 
is the voluntary ghetto. The ghetto is 2b long. The ghetto center is the most attractive location. 
Imagine that the ethnic temple, shops or schools are there. The two groups are identical in income 
and preferences. Curve 1 is the profile of land rent assuming no prejudice by either group. What 
would happen if the host group were prejudiced and regarded distance to the border as a bad? 
This is the case of curve 2. Host residents flee away from the border and the ghetto expands to 
2b′. Ghetto rents are lowered with the arbitrage condition holding anew at b′. Population density 
within the ghetto falls. Outside, the same people squeeze into less land raising average densities 
and rents. The prejudiced group pays for its prejudice in higher average rents and densities, while 
the ethnic group benefits. Curve 3 shows what happens if the population in the ghetto increases 
but the border cannot expand beyond b′ due to exclusion. Then, ghetto rents rise and ethnic 
residents pay more for land than the host group, as was assumed by Kain (1968).  
[ FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ] 
        Figure 3d is the case of a slum. The ethnic amenities of the voluntary ghetto are not present. 
As in Bailey, residents prefer to be interspersed with the majority, regarding distance to the ghetto 
border as a good or distance to the ghetto center as a bad. As in Bailey, the majority is prejudiced 
and regards distance to the border as a bad. Curve 1 depicts the equilibrium rent profile. Curve 2 
shows an increase in ghetto rents if ghetto population increased but the border could not expand 
due to zoning. At the border, the ethnic group pays more for land than does the majority. But this 
may not be true on average when rents throughout the ghetto are considered.    
        Figure 3d (curve 1) leaves one thing unanswered. Rents in the ghetto are lower than outside. 
The border is established by arbitrage in the intensive margin (the areas just by the border). Why 
is there no arbitrage at the extensive margin (throughout the ghetto) also? A developer could buy 
all the ghetto land by paying a little more than the equilibrium price of land and sell it to members 
of the majority that would come in from other cities. The developer would make a windfall gain 
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giant land assembly would take so long to complete as to yield a subnormal investment return. If 
ghetto residents who are bought out can only relocate to the ghettos of other cities, then there 
would be no place for them to go on the net. This brings up the interesting question of why blacks 
and whites are not completely segregated in different cities. The complementarities between low 
and high skills in production may be an important reason for the co-location of rich and poor and, 
indirectly, of ethnic groups.    
5. The efficiency of segregation 
    Are ghettos and ethnic segregation efficient? Since voluntary ghettos exploit concentration, it 
follows that ghetto formation has socially desirable aspects. But the question of how big and how 
many ghettos requires balancing the complex positive and negative externalities from ethnic 
concentration. An optimal ghetto size implies that the ethnic population should be organized into 
a number of ghettos, possibly in the same city. Optimal ghetto size is reached when adding one 
more person to the ghetto creates social marginal benefits and costs that are equal. In considering 
the benefits and the costs we must account those of the majority and those of the ghetto 
population. But since the negative and positive externalities are unpriced, it is doubtful that real 
ghettos are optimally sized.  
      Hoyt (1939) noted that most ghettos are not centered on downtowns in a roughly circular or 
concentric pattern, but tend to jot out toward the suburbs, looking like a roughly cut pie slice, a 
sectoral pattern.
13 I will present a simple model encapsulating Hoyt’s idea. Imagine that the 
ghetto is designed by a racist planner who minimizes the points of contact between whites and 
blacks, known as the minimum border-length hypothesis.
14 Since contacts happen along the 
border, the objective is achieved by minimizing the border’s length. For a concentric ghetto 
(Figure 4a) the border length is the perimeter2 c r π . For the sectoral ghetto, it is2 s r , twice the 
radius (Figure 4b). Each person is allocated one unit of land.
15 There are  blacks and   
whites. In the concentric case, the length of the border will be . Suppose that the 






( 2 c B π =
φ  of the circle extending to the rural fringe. The ghetto land is 
2
b N s r φπ =  and 
2 (1 w N ) s r φ π =− remains for whites. Solve for φ  from the first equation and 
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13 The Millwaukee ghetto of Figure 1 roughly conforms to such a pattern. 
14 Loury (1978) developed a more complex model of the shape of the ghetto. 
15 I ignore the possibility that the racist planner allocates smaller lots to blacks. 
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The racist planner will prefer a sectoral ghetto if the blacks are more than 11.3% of the whites. 
Otherwise he will prefer a circular ghetto. Real ghettos are not the work of racist planners but of a 
myriad of actions by individuals, developers and local governments. It is not clear why the 
sectoral shape emerges.       
[ FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE ] 
     Complete segregation can be Pareto optimal though it is repugnant to many. Schelling (1969) 
proposed a simple but fascinating way of thinking about the relocation behavior of prejudiced 
individuals acting independently and myopically. I will show here that his idea extends to optimal 
segregation. Figure 5 illustrates Schelling’s model for a linear array of an arbitrary seven 
locations. Imagine them to be seven adjacent houses on a street. Other locations are not available. 
There are four persons denoted as ⊕ . Three others are shown by a . Each is prejudiced in the 
sense that his utility is highest if both neighbors are of his type. Utility is lower if only one 
neighbor is of one’s own type and lowest if one is surrounded by the opposite type. Suppose that 
an agent wants to relocate if he is so surrounded. If at least one agent wants to relocate the 
arrangement is not in equilibrium. Arrangement (a) is not in equilibrium because 5 and 6 want to 
move. If they swap places, they improve their own utilities and those of 4 and 7. Swapping results 
in (b), an equilibrium in which the are ghettoized. (b) Pareto dominates (a). The highest social 
welfare occurs under the Pareto efficient arrangement (c). This minimizes the points of contact 
between the two types so that there is only one individual of each type experiencing an externality 
and no swaps will improve welfare. A planner is needed to achieve (c), since (b) is in equilibrium 
and no voluntary swaps will be initiated between a 
:
:
⊕ and a: . The racist planner would insure 
that the socially optimal pattern (c) emerged. Another mechanism for transitioning from pattern 
(b) to (c) is for persons 1 and 2 to form a coalition and persuade the pair 4 and 5 to swap places 
with them. Only one person in each pair improves his utility, therefore the coalitions will work 
only if the gainer in each pair gains enough to compensate his partner. The reader is invited to 
make up some numbers and work out an example where this is possible.     
[ FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE ] 
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neighborhood? Assume  blacks and whites. Land consists of two islands. Coincidentally, 









θ =  for a black andUk w b a w
θ =  for a white.  is the fraction of an island’s 
resident that is black and a the fraction of an island’s resident that is white. Assume01
b a
w θ <≤
b k w k
0 =
. 
Assume that populations within an island contact randomly. Then, the higher the proportion of the 
other type on one’s island is, the higher is the probability of contact. The parameters  and   
measure prejudice toward the presence of the other group on one’s island. If  , persons 
could be allocated to islands in any way one pleased without any detriment. Consider 
and . This, as in Bailey’s model, means that blacks like having more whites on their 
island while whites dislike having more blacks on theirs. Suppose that people are allocated to the 
islands according to their proportion in the total population. Hence, 
bw kk =













. This is the perfectly integrated allocation. Another is the perfectly segregated 
allocation under which all whites are allocated to island two and all blacks to island one. Then 
. Under complete segregation welfare is zero since there are no externalities. Under 
integration, aggregate welfare isWN . w w b N k a Ib b w a k
θ θ =+ If  0 I W < , segregation is socially 











If blacks are indifferent toward whites ( 0 b k = ) but whites are prejudiced ( ), then 
segregation is preferable. For any positive , segregation is preferable if whites are sufficiently 
prejudiced, namely 
0 w k <
b k
w k is sufficiently large. The larger the percentage of blacks in society the 
more prejudiced whites would have to be for segregation to be preferable. That is because the 
per-person utility gains from segregation accruing to whites need to be balanced against the per-
person gains from integration accruing to a larger number of blacks. In South Africa whites were 
a minority but imposed apartheid on blacks. In the United States blacks are a minority but have 
been largely segregated in ghettos. The above inequality implies that both outcomes may be 
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whites are much more racially prejudiced than are American whites.             
    Socially  optimal  segregation  is  rendered  more complex if intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic 
externalities are intergenerational. For example, it is arguable that growing up segregated and 
attending segregated schools causes new generations to remain prejudiced whereas integration 
improves interethnic understanding and cross cultural fertilization. Fostering more integration 
may impose costs on prejudiced current generations who dislike it but should have benefits for 
future generations since children will be less prejudiced as adults. Ghetto children can be 
educated more cheaply when mixed with children of the majority who may be better learners, 
while the cost of educating the majority increases when they share schools with the children of 
ghetto residents. Still, integration by income and ethnic background can increase average school 
performance through peer effects, and boost human capital accumulation. Benabou (1993) 
showed that spatial segregation with separate schools is often the equilibrium outcome, while 
residential and school integration often the optimal outcome.     
6. Public policy and politics 
    Socrates’ advice [see Introduction] was to deal with inequality and segregation, by some form 
of redistribution. It has been particularly hard to heed such advice.  The public policy response to 
ethnic segregation has varied enormously and has gone to bewildering extremes. Recently, “the 
government of Rio de Janeiro State proposed to build a [3 meter tall concrete] wall around its 
sprawling favelas in an effort to help control rampant crime in the picture postcard city.” (Colitt, 
2004). Similarly, Israel is walling off the Palestinian Arabs to protect itself from terrorist attacks. 
Recently, the wall was endorsed by Israel’s highest court provided its alignment considered 
Palestinian rights. The International Court of Justice declared the wall illegal. 
      India’s recent policy toward Dharavi, Asia’s largest slum [see Introduction], is to rehabilitate 
it with multistory buildings at a cost of $1.3 billion (Katyal and Lengade, 2004). This contrasts 
with India’s slum removal policies of the 1970s and 1980s in which demolitions were, in some 
cases, followed by residents being packed into buses, driven to city fringes and told to return to 
their rural homes.  Indian police is often accused of harassing Muslims. Perry (2003) claims that 
the “Gujarat authorities even went so far as to price Muslim lives below those of Hindus, offering 
$ 2,050 in state compensation for Muslims killed but double that for the riot’s 58 Hindu victims.”    
      Despite countless United Nations resolutions calling for the withdrawal of troops and the 
restoration of the free movements of people, Kofi Annan, the secretary general of the United 
Nations, recently proposed a system of governance that would legitimize the military-imposed 
territorial and ethnic partition of Cyprus, with only partial rights to Greeks to resettle and reclaim 
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The Turkish government demanded that these apartheid measures become part of the primary law 
of the European Union in advance of Cyprus’s admission into Europe on May 1, 2004. While 
some (Rotberg, 2004) have naively defended the Annan Plan, others (Avineri, 2004) have pointed 
out that it ghettoizes Greek Cypriots in violation of the European laws of free settlement.  The 
Annan Plan required its ratification through separate referenda by both Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots including the illegally imported Turkish settlers. Not surprisingly, 76% of Greeks voted 
against while 60% of Turks voted in favor. 
       The right to locate freely wherever one wants within a country is fundamental to all modern 
societies. Free movement of people among member countries is one of the most basic tenets of 
the European Union. A Europe with a low fertility rate and high wages induces immigration from 
the poorer countries in the Union and elsewhere to the richer ones causing international ethnic 
integration while, at the same time, ethnic ghettos emerge and grow within European cities 
causing intra-urban ethnic segregation. A trend of growing segregation and social exclusion in 
European cities is already established (Madanipur et.al., 1998; Roche and Berkel, 1997). In the 
new post Cold War era of civilizational tensions (Huntington, 1993) the growth of ghettos, 
especially Muslim ghettos, is becoming an issue. As Johnson (2004) puts it “Germany has an 
estimated three million Muslim immigrants. Elsewhere in Europe are millions more. Many live in 
large cities’ immigrant ghettos, speaking the local language poorly, dropping out of school at 
high rates and making up an outsized share of prison populations. So the broader issues… are 
who represents these people, and how – or whether – they are to be fully integrated into 
European society.”   
        Immigration can also be controlled indirectly. Becker (2000) has advocated that immigrants 
to the United States not be given public assistance for a number of years after entry. This amounts 
to the imposition of a tax on immigrants because they add to social costs. The policy would slow 
immigration toward its optimal level. Subsidizing Mexican economic development, would also 
slow immigration (Anas, 2002). In the spirit of the Coase Theorem (Coase,1960) the two 
approaches should yield roughly equivalent outcomes: the externality imposed by an immigrant 
can be mitigated either by admitting him and taxing him for the marginal social costs he imposes 
or subsidizing him to stay out by paying him the marginal benefit of foregoing to immigrate.  
     Slowing immigration aside, what should public policy do about ghettos where the racial or 
ethnic concentration appears to have detrimental effects? American social policy has 
experimented with a variety of measures with minor effects. These include the busing of children 
to achieve racially balanced schools, and the Section 8 and other housing subsidies to increase the 
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decisions in New Jersey in the 1970s and 1980s, the courts concluded that suburban land use 
controls violated the state’s constitution, but these decisions had only some effect in New Jersey.  
Although suburban zoning remains the chief obstacle to the suburbanization of ghettoized black 
and Hispanic minorities, current public policy is limited to subsidizing inner cities.  Although 
such income redistribution is not spatially targeted, it may be politically justified as compensation 
to ghetto residents for the prevailing exclusion.   
       The growing concentration of black voters in central cities (see Table 1) has resulted in the 
election of more black mayors and local politicians (McWirther, 2000). Increased control over 
central city politics may provide blacks an incentive to stay ghettoized. Some black politicians are 
among the loudest opponents of metropolitan governance or low cost housing programs that 
would scatter blacks in the suburbs, since this dilutes their base of voters. It would also stand to 
reason that the growing proportion of minorities in central cities helps extract a bigger stream of 
subsidies from Washington and the state governments. But it is unclear whether these political 
economies of scale have improved the welfare of African and Hispanic Americans.  
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         Percent non-Hispanic Blacks                    
  Central city          Suburbs  Ghettoization ndex 
Primary  MSA  1980 1990  2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI   21.0   27.7   34.4    0.5    0.7     1.6  42.0  39.6  21.5 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY   24.1   27.9   34.8    1.2    1.4    2.4  20.0  19.9  14.5 
Indianapolis, IN   20.9   22.0   25.4    1.0    1.4    2.2  20.9  15.7  11.5 
Rochester, NY   25.4   30.7   39.1    2.1    2.5    3.5  12.1  12.3  11.2 
Detroit, MI   55.9   66.0   71.4    3.4    4.3    6.6  16.4  15.3  10.8 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN   33.4   37.8   43.5    4.2    4.5    5.7    7.9    8.4    7.6 
Kansas City, MO-KS   24.6   26.1   27.4    1.5    2.2    3.7  16.4  11.9    7.4 
Boston, MA-NA   16.5   18.6   20.3    1.0    1.8    2.8  16.5  10.3    7.3 
Minneapolis-St, Paul, MN-WI     6.4   10.4   17.0    0.5    1.1    2.9  12.8    9.5    5.9 
Columbus, OH   19.1   20.2   23.4    1.8    3.0    4.4  10.6    6.7    5.3 
Pittsburgh, PA     5.5     6.2     6.6    3.8    4.1    5.3    6.3    6.2    5.2 
Hartford, CT   27.9   30.1   31.4    2.5    3.6    6.1  11.2    8.4    5.1 
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA     5.5     6.2    6.6    0.4    0.6    1.3  13.8  10.3    5.1 
Cleveland-Lorain-Elmyra,OH   37.5   39.6   44.1    6.4     8.0    9.7    5.9    5.0    4.5 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ   38.3   40.1   43.8    6.9    7.8    9.7    5.6    5.1    4.5 
Baltimore, MD   53.7   57.8   63.1    8.4  10.4  14.9    6.4    5.6    4.2 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, 
RI-MA 
   4.2     5.2     7.5    0.6    1.1    1.9    7.0    4.7    3.9 
Chicago, IL   36.8   35.8   33.8    4.6    6.4    8.8    8.0    5.6    3.8 
Oakland, CA   35.7   33.2   29.0    6.4    7.4    8.4    5.6    4.5    3.5 
St. Louis, MO-IL   39.8   40.0   42.1    8.1    9.7  12.5    4.9    4.1    3.4 
New Orleans, LA   52.6   59.0   64.6  13.9  17.7  21.0    3.8    3.3    3.0 
Newark, NJ   57.3   55.8   53.0  13.1  15.6  17.8    4.4    3.6    2.9 
Denver, CO   11.9  12.4   11.6    1.8    3.0    3.9    6.6    4.1    2.9 
USA   22.5   22.1   22.8    6.1    6.9    8.8    3.7    3.2    2.6 
Atlanta, GA.   66.0   66.8   61.6  13.8  18.7  25.6    4.8     3.4    2.4  
Dallas, TX   25.4   25.1   23.1    5.3    7.3    9.7    4.8    3.4    2.4 
Houston, TX   26.3   26.2   24.7    6.1    8.9  10.7    4.3    2.9    2.3 
San Francisco, CA   12.5   10.5     8.2    5.0    4.7    3.7    2.5    2.2    2.2 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA     7.6     8.1     7.9    1.0    2.0    3.9    7.6    4.0    2.0 
New York, NY (excl. suburbs in 
Long Island, New Jersey and 
Connecticut) 
 23.9   25.2   25.5    9.6  11.0  12.6    2.5    2.3    2.0 
Washington, DC   55.8   50.4   45.2  16.2  18.8  22.9    3.4    2.7    1.9 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, 
FL 
   9.1     8.8   10.4    3.4    4.0    5.8    2.7    2.2    1.8   
San Diego, CA     7.9     8.3    7.8    2.7    3.7    4.6    2.9    2.2    1.7 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach., VA-NC   29.5   30.0  35.2  23.7  21.3  21.1    1.2    1.4    1.7 
San Jose, CA     3.7     3.9    3.4    2.1    2.5    2.2    1.8    1.6    1.5 
Fort Lauderdale, FL   20.4   27.3  31.0    9.2   13.2  20.6    2.2    2.1    1.5 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA   16.1   13.1  12.1    9.1    8.3    8.2    1.8    1.6    1.5 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ     3.6     3.8    4.4    2.0    2.2    3.1    1.8    1.7    1.4 
Orange County, CA      2.3     2.2    2.0    0.9    1.4    1.7    2.6    1.6    1.2 
Riverside-San Bernadino, CA     8.2     8.3    9.0    3.9    6.1    7.9    2.1    1.4    1.1 
San Antonio, TX     7.0     6.7    6.7    5.2    5.8    6.7    1.3    1.2    1.0 
Miami, FL   18.7   20.4  17.8  15.8  18.7  20.4    1.2    1.1    0.8 
TABLE 1: Ghettoization trends for non-Hispanic blacks in the 43 PMSAs with more than 1 
million population in 1980, ranked by year 2000 ghettoization index  
 




FIGURE 1: Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI. The most segregated large metropolitan area for 
African Americans in 2000. Source: Iceland and Weinberg (2002) 






FIGURE 2: Orange County, CA. The least segregated large metropolitan area for 
African Americans in 2000. Source: Iceland and Weinberg (2002) 
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FIGURE 5: (a) Unstable allocation; (b) ghettoized equilibrium;  
and (c) Pareto efficient ghetto in a Schelling-type model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 